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DICTA

May, 1954

CASE COMMENTS
EVIDENCE: ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE OBTAINED
BY WIRETAPPING-In a recent United States Supreme Court
case, Schwartz v. Texas,' the petitioner, a pawnbroker, became
involved in a conspiracy with two men, one named Jarrett and
the other named Bennett. The latter two were to rob certain people and, according to the plan, were to bring the loot to the petitioner who was to dispose of it and divide the proceeds.
Pursuant to the plan a woman was robbed of some valuable
jewels. The petitioner, after disposing of the jewels, repeatedly
delayed settlement with the robbers and the three finally fell out.
The petitioner then tipped off the police as to where they could
find Jarrett. After Jarrett had been in jail about two weeks he
consented to telephone the petitioner from the sheriff's office. With
the knowledge and consent of Jarrett a professional operator set
up an induction coil connected to a recorder amplifier thereby enabling the operator to overhear and record the conversation between Jarrett and the petitioner. These records were used as
evidence when the petitioner was convicted as an accomplice to
the crime of robbery. The records, admitted only after Jarrett
and the petitioner had testified, corroborated Jarrett and discredited the petitioner.
Seven members of the court, with Mr. Justice Frankfurter
concurring in a separate opinion and Mr. Justice Douglas dissenting, held that the federal prohibition of the unauthorized interception of a telephone communication does not bar the use of such
communications as evidence in a criminal proceeding in a state
court. This is true irrespective of whether the state rule admitting
such evidence is established by the legislature or the courts.
The pertinent part of Section 605 of the Federal Communications Act is as follows:
. . . no person not being authorized by the sender
shall intercept any communication and divulge or publish
the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or
meaning of such intercepted communication to any person. .
This has been construed by the United States Supreme Court
to render inadmissible in any federal court intercepted communications when such communication is sought to be divulged in
violation of the act.3 It was later held that4 this rule applied even
though the telephone calls were intrastate.
-

Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U. S. 199, 73 S. Ct. 232, 97 L. Ed. 231 (Dec., 1952).
47 U.S.C. Section 605.

Nardone v. United States, 302 U. S. 379 (1937).
Weiss v. United States, 308 U. S. 321 (1939).
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A similar rule was laid down by the United States Supreme
Court regarding unlawful searches and seizures under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. The court held
that evidence obtained by a state officer, by means which would
constitute an unlawful seach and seizure, is nonetheless admissible in a state court 5 even though it had been established that evidence obtained by such means would clearly 6be inadmissible in
a federal court under the Fourth Amendment.
In the Schwartz case the state rule admitting the wiretapping
evidence was established by statute.7 The statute, as amended,
rendered inadmissible in criminal trials evidence obtained in violation of the constitution or laws of Texas or of any provision of
the Federal Constitution. This statute did not cover evidence obtained in violation of the laws (as distinguished from the Constitution) of the United States. Colorado apparently has no such
statutory rule of evidence to bring it within the rule approved in
the Schwartz case.
Colorado does have a statute which makes it a misdemeanor
to tap a telephone or telegraph line. The pertinent part of this
statute states:
Any person who cuts, breaks, taps or makes any connection with any telegraph or telephone line, wire, cable
or instrument belonging to another, and wilfully reads,
takes or copies any message, communication or report
intended for another passing over any such telegraph
or telephone line, wire, or cable in this state . . . shall
be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor."
In Colorado, therefore, we are governed by a statute which
brings about the same result as the Texas statute, in that it prohibits the obtaining of evidence by wiretapping, but does not render such evidence inadmissible in the state courts. The Supreme
Court makes it clear that the rule of the Schwartz case, in the
absence of a direct expression by Congress, is simply an additional
factor for a state to consider in formulating a rule of evidence
for use in its own courts. The Colorado Supreme Court has not
had an opportunity to specifically rule upon the admissibility of
evidence obtained by wiretapping. However, the court has held
on several occasions that evidence illegally taken from a person
against whom it is offered or otherwise unlawfully obtained is
nonetheless admissible if pertinent to the issue.9 It is reasonable
to assume that the rule would be followed in a case involving wiretapping and that evidence so obtained would be amissible in crimiWolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25 (1949).
'Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383 (1914).
'Tex. Laws, 1925, Ch. 49, Sec. 1.
1935 C.S.A., Chap. 48, Sec. 129.
'Wolf v. People, 117 Colo. 279, 187 P. (2d) 926; Massantonio v. People, 77
Colo. 392, 236 P. 1019.
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nal trials in the Colorado courts even though the act be a flagrant
violation of the Federal Communications Act and the Colorado
statute. 10 It is also reasonable to assume that in a prosecution in
a state court for a state crime, the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Federal Constitution would not forbid the admission of relevant
evidence even though obtained by a violation of Section 11605 of
the Federal Communications Act or the Colorado statute.
After a careful look at the Schwartz case, it is apparent that
a state may still enact a law which prohibits the obtaining of wiretapping evidence and yet the state criminal courts can admit such
illegally obtained evidence without violating the laws or Constitution of the United States. The United States Supreme Court
in support of this reasoning said,
Where a state has carefully legislated so as not to
render inadmissible evidence obtained and sought to be
divulged in violation of the laws of the United States,
this court will not extend by implication the statute of
the United States so as to invalidate the specific language
of the state statute. If Congress is authorized to act in
a field, it should manifest its intention clearly. It will
not be presumed that a federal statute was intended to
supersede the exercise of the power of the state unless
there is a clear manifestation to do so.12
It is clear that Congress has not manifested an intent to supersede the exercised power of a state in this matter, so to this date
there is nothing that would bar a state from enacting and enforcing such legislation.
It is interesting to note, in conclusion, that the United States
Supreme Court did not decide whether or not Congress has the
power to impose a rule of evidence on the courts of a state.
DWIGHT A. HAMILTON.
WRONGFUL DEATH: MEASURE OF DAMAGES FOR
DEATH OF A MINOR CHILD-The case of McEntyre v. Jones'
was brought in Conejos County by the mother of a deceased thirteen year old girl. The facts were in dispute, but the jury found
that the defendant wife had negligently driven the defendants'
truck against the girl, causing her death. Judgment was entered
on a verdict of $7,500 for the plaintiff, and the defendants bring
error. Affirmed.
The defendants assert that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury as to the measurement of damages. The instruc" Hubin v. State, 180 Md. 279, 23 A. (2d) 706; People v. Stemmer, 298 N. Y.
728, 83 N. E. (2d) 141; Harlem v. Bell, 296 N. Y. 15, 68 N. E. (2d) 854;_People
v. Channell, 101 Cal. App. (2d) 192, 236 P. (2d) 654.
11Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25 (1949).
Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U. S. 199 (Dec., 1952).
- Colo. -, 263 P. (2d) 313 (1953), 1953-54 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 5, p. 97.
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tion was, in part, "In assessing the plaintiff's damages, if any,
you should consider the age, health and condition of life of her
deceased daughter, her habits of industry, her ability to earn
money, her disposition to aid and assist the plaintiff, and the
probable duration of the life of the plaintiff and of her deceased
daughter, if she had not died as a result of the accident." The
Supreme Court holds that the instruction was proper-that damages should be measured by the life expectancy of the deceased
child limited to the life expectancy of the beneficiary mother, and
not limited to the years of minority of the child.
The cases of Pierce v. Conners 2 and Tadlock v. Lloyd 3 were
contra to this case and expressly limited recovery to the prospective net pecuniary loss during the years of the deceased child's
minority.
The cases of Lehrer v. Lorenzen 4 and St. Lukes Hospital Association v. Long 5 accord with the present case though not expressly so. In both cases the Supreme Court found that the instructions as to the measurement of damages were proper. The
instruction in the Lehrer case suggested that the jury take "into
consideration the child's disposition and ability to contribute to
the parents' wants and necessities during their probable duration
of life." The instruction in the St. Lukes Hospital case was almost
identical to the instruction given in the present case. Both of
these instructions indicated that recovery was not to be limited
to the years of minority of the deceased child. However, in neither
case was the Court called upon to decide the exact point.
In the present case, the Court finds that the law in Colorado
upon this question has been changed by the above mentioned
cases; and the only further justification given for this change is
that the rule in Colorado now accords with that in the majority
of states.
The Colorado wrongful death statute 6 specifically permits
recovery for the wrongful death of a minor child. It seems logical
to interpret the statute as permitting recovery for the total net
pecuniary loss rather than limitihg recovery to an arbitrary period
not set by the legislature.
The best argument in favor of limiting recovery to the years
of minority is that, while it is difficult for the jury to measure
the loss during minority, to permit recovery for the loss beyond
the years of minority would open the way for sheer speculation
by the jury. In answer to this, it should be pointed out that in
all cases the jury is instructed to permit recovery only for proven
damages. Where the plaintiff is able to prove a loss beyond the
minor years of deceased, e.g., where the twenty year old was mak'20 Colo. 178, 37 P. 721 (1894).
65 Colo. 40, 173 P. 200 (1918).
Colo. 17, 233 P. (2d) 382 (1951).
5125 Colo. 25, 240 P. (2d) 917 (1952).
"35 C.S.A., Ch. 50, Secs. 1, 2 and 3.
4124
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ing a substantial contribution to his parents at the time of his
death, it would be unjust and against the obvious intent of the
legislature to limit recovery to the period of minority.
The better rule, with which Colorado now is in accord, permits the jury, within the legal limit set by the court and legislature, to determine how much loss the plaintiff has proved, without
setting up some arbitrary limitation of years between the death
of the minor and the estimated life expectancy of the parent.
GEORGE GIBSON

STATUTES: ONLY A PARTY AFFECTED CAN CHALLENGE CONSTITUTIONALITY-The case of Higgins v. Sinnock I would appear to have been an attempt to accomplish indirectly that which could not have been done directly. This suit was
instituted as a class action on behalf of the old age pensioners,
and it sought a declaratory judgment on the validity of a recent
statute 2 that made elderly inmates of public institutions eligible
for old age pensions. Such inmates had previously been excluded,
so the result of the statute was to increase the number of persons
participating in the state's pension fund. This would appear to
give the plaintiffs a sufficient interest for them to challenge the
legislature's granting of these pensions, but this question did not
come before the court.
Conceding that the extension to these new eligibles was not
unconstitutional, the plaintiffs instead challenged a provision of
the act that the pension of an inmate would be paid to the chief
financial officer of the institution as a trustee. The theory of the
plaintiffs' case was that this procedural provision was not separable
and the whole act would have to fail if the court should rule that
this payment procedure was in violation of the state constitution.
This presented to the court the question as to whether the provisions were separable, and the court held that they were, pointing
out that the procedure for payment is entirely separate and distinct from the vesting of the rights.
This, then, left the question of whether the plaintiffs were in
a position to challenge the payment provision as such. The court
pointed out that the plaintiffs were not inmates of an institution
and that the method of payments did not affect their interests in
any respect. Accordingly, the court ruled that they were not proper
parties to bring this challenge. As a result, the court was not
called to rule upon the only part of the act that was attacked.
While the trial court declared the act constitutional, and the
Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, it is submitted that there
was no necessity for a determination of constitutionality. The rulings on the separability and on the requisite interest both appear
to be orthodox, and they produce the same result that a direct
11953-54 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 9, p. 186.
2 CoLo. LAWS, C. 171 (1953).
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attack on the legislative grant of the pensions would have as conceded by the plaintiffs. This case was not decided on any principle
that one cannot do indirectly that which he cannot do directly, but
it is submitted that this is a good example of a case where that
result occurs.

T. H. CHRYSLER
To Whom It May Concern:
The Domestic Relations Division of the Second Judicial District has temporarily set up the following schedule which will be
in effect until further order:
MONDAYS:
Hearings on non-contested divorce actions. The
cases will be staggered through the day at twenty-minute intervals
to suit the convenience of the parties and of counsel. Counsel for
non-appearing defendants will be assigned either upon application of counsel or upon the Court's own motion when it appears
necessary or desirable. In all cases where counsel is not assigned
to represent the non-appearing defendant, the Court will request
plaintiff's attorney to inform defendant by registered mail (return
receipt requested) of the time and place the case will be heard,
informing him generally of his right to be present, etc.,-and following the hearing, plaintiff's counsel will send the defendant a
copy of the interlocutory decree.
TUESDAYS AND FRIDAYS: Hearings on motions for temporary
alimony, support, attorney's fees, and court costs, and the hearings will also be staggered through the day to suit the convenience
of parties and of counsel. In all such cases the Court is requesting
counsel to file at least five days before the hearing a sworn statement of all the assets of his client, and at the same time, furnish
a copy thereof to opposing counsel. In general, the affidavits should
contain a statement of all assets of both parties, earning capacity,
and employment, if any, the woman's minimum needs and requirements to support herself and children, and the husband's estimate
of his ability to pay. Also heard on Tuesdays and Fridays will be
citations and restraining orders.
WEDNESDAYS AND THURSDAYS: Hearings of contested matters
both as to divorce and property settlement.
The Court is asking the cooperation of counsel in this temporary arrangement, and also, full cooperation in attempting reconciliation of the parties whenever possible, and especially where
children are involved.
The Court, at a later date, expects to make known to lawyers
and the people of the community generally the facilities available
for marriage and family counseling, looking toward a broad preventive program, and with the hope of reducing the divorce rate
in the community.
JOSEPH E. COOK, Judge.
January 12, 1954.

